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1. «In contrast to what Nida-R?melin (Chapter 16 of this book) prefers from her point of view, it would not be appropriate, I think, to say that modaleons change color when the index world changes normal light. When talking counterfactually about changing light we would not say, for instance, that sunflowers would be orange if a huge red filter were fixed between the sun and the earth; rather we would say that they look orange under these circumstances, though they still are yellow. Similarly, we would say that modaleons, which are actually blue, would still be blue, but look red if the world were filled with twinlight.» The Character of Color Terms: A Materialist View, Wolfgang Spohn, p.6

2. «If someone with normal colour vision looks at a lemon in good light, the lemon will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that bananas and grapefruit also appear to have, and which we call "yellow" in English. As we all know, however, it does not follow from the fact that an object visually appears to have a certain property that the object has that property. To use an example dating back to the ancient Greeks,a straight oar half-immersed in water appears bent, but of course it does not have the property of being bent. Ordinarily we take for granted that lemons and so forth are as they appear, but in a philosophical mood one naturally wonders whether we are right to do so.» ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2000 © Macmillan Reference Ltd, Colour Vision, Philosophical Issues About Colour#Vision. Alex Byrne MIT, Massachusetts, USA; David R. Hilbert University of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois, USA, ch. 2.1


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